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How Courts Came to Govern

At 7:53

A.M.

on December 7, 1941, Japanese bombers struck U.S.

naval bases on Oahu, Hawaii, killing 2,403 U.S. military personnel
~nd ~itizens. Not included in the offici~l casualty count but nonetheless a victjm of the attack was an evil fellow named Jim C~w.
World War 'II put soldiers of diverse skin colors in motion
~r~,und the Country. Northern whites witnessed segregation in the
'"~~~~~··.~d s~~ther~ blacks experienced 'the freer, but still deeply
~a.~~?t~~~s ~f t~e North .. The blo~d they shed overseas was all
~esJ~e c~l~~· The common enemy, Adolf Hitler, exemplified the

~vii in the. ~laims of racial superiority that gave Jim Crow life. The
, <~a.~.c~?ed ~t~<~uestion the governmentally imposed second-class
.• !;·•;.~, iis ~fblac~fTue cultural tide was turning, as became clear when
~niHff.'fyY,S. Trilman ended official segregation in the military
. ou most southern whites still believed in segregation, they
· t>n a colli.si<>n course with histor}'. Northern businesses, which
'.the ii6n's share of the nation's investment funds, were.
o mvest 1n the Deep Sou · eaving it an' economic back10n was a1s0~·ilicr
ly indefeifsible in the world
rita~n ceded iifdependence to

India in 1947, formally

he'~.wll!t~~F's~~~~i~~:::}~y;~COid ~ar~f~~gg~eof
· s'Wiili dieSoviet Unioh;JimCrow·was a dangerous
U~itf<i States.

.

.

·

.
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Segregation was doomed, but just when and how it would end
was not foreordained. Nor was it fated that Thurgood Marshall and
his colleagues working with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund would
play the pivotal roles they did.

Massive Resistance
Marshall and others who mapped the litigation campaign to end
school segregation began without power. The African Americans
among them had been brought up in a society that threatened to
lynch those who protested their subservient status. Nonetheless,
they litigated throughout the South in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
with no assurance that they would win. The only certainty was that
they would have to bear daily indignities, such as having to eat their
lunches huddled in a car because no restaurant would seat them.
Finally, in the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court handed down the decision for which Marshall and
his colleagues had so Jong striven,' The Court declared school segregation unconstitutional. It took <.;onsiderablecourage for Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues on the bench to issue this unanimous, politically charged, precedent-breaking decision .
.Yet Brown itself made h"r~y a dent in segregation. Southern
politicians launched a counterattack. Citing constitutional theories
reversed by the Civil War, they claimed the right to disregard Su. preme Court decisions -wi.th -which their white constituents disagreed.To keep African Americans out of the schools and "in their
. place;' these officials organized what they termed "massive resistance:' They blocked schoolhouse doors, declaring, "Segregation
today, segregation forever:' Sheriffs used cattle prods on peaceful
demonstrators. Governors egged white mobs into action-and it
appeared for a while that the mobs might -win- Some federal judges
abetted the resistance; those who tried to enforce the law got only
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grudging support from Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John
F. Kennedy. For a while, the "massive resistance" threatened to nullify the Supreme Court's decision in Brown.
Backlash in the South produced a counter-backlash in the rest of
the nation. Television, a new force in American politics, brought
the mobs defending "The Southern Way of Life" into America's living rooms. As Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School wrote
in 1962:
Here were grown men and women furiously confronting their
enemy: two, three, a half dozen scrubbed, starched, scared, and
•.incredibly.brave colored children. The moral bankruptcy, the
shame of the thing, was evident.. , . There was an unforgettable
scene, for example, in one CBSnewscast from New Orleans, of a
white mother fairly foaming at the mouth with the effort to rivet
'her distracted little boy's attention and teach him how to liate.
. ~d repeatedly, the ugly spitting curse, NIGGER! The effect
achieved on an unprecedented number of people with unprecedented speed, must have been something like what used to happen to individuals (the young Lincoln among them) at the sight
· of an actual slaveauction: ... Mob action led to the mobilization
'C?,(n()ryhern opinion in support of the Court's decision-not
f{ hll"l~rel}'.~.~5~1-1~«!. mob is disorderly, but because it concretized
·M ~e abs~racfi<>ll of rac~.D"l· ... One of those supreme occasions
. . had beenbrought about when a decisive reprise is open to the
p9litical.branches; it was for them to make the Court's decision
their r.ule. c:>,fp9litiali action, or not to do so, and thus to.make or
>.~f(!.~.~~~.~e~~~fonjt~elf. 'fhe! politi~ ~nmc~(!S ... had inde~C!ll.~
"'·~Yi,?n tliei~.9wn ~~ponsibility, to speak tlieir mora} ap:
•c . . · · va} of the Court's decision, to support it by drawin~ on their
• •:own resources; and to act in pursuance of it. This was one time.
;~hen hiding behind the judges' skirts would not do. The politiinstitutions had a decision of their own to make.2

tll~

j·.e>

·.,;:· ... ··'·-':i/.''-··---:· ..

_.,. __,_

.. ··.-

_._

.. ,.

,.,_

•

_,,_

·-.··-.-

., .._.,

ngress arid-the presidentjdecided in favor of equal rights be.·.
ctoraie shocked by. tlies~ ugly images, demanded it.
. ey. beg

enacting antisegr~ationist statutes with· teeth.

f,passillg the ~uc~ .. insteadsofrtelling federal agencies to
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pursue a melange of goals designed to please everyone-elected officials straightforwardly outlawed the practices that kept African
Americans out of schools and voting booths. To ensure that these
new laws were obeyed, Congress gave the Department of Justice the
authority, funding, and political backing it needed to sue in the
name of the United States. The Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare was meanwhile instructed to cut off federal money to
school districts that failed to desegregate.

Brown v. Board of Education and the ten years of litigation that
followed produced hardly any practical change in the field, but what
Congress did beginning in 1964 brought massive change. 3 With
Brown; the S~preme Court had, .,not so much imposed its values on
society as called the questio11 of }Vhether Jim Crow should live on.
Society answered by coming down decisively against racism.
, Southern politicians hollered "states' rights:' This principlethat national government should stay out of the affairs of state and
local. governments and that also goes by the name federalism-has
validity burwas a loserxin the.context of desegregation.
Federalism
.
.
had never stopped federal judges from protecting other constitutioncll r.i~ts, al}.d the stipi:ehi~ 9Jtirt haldecid.ed that school segregation violated the Constitution. State elected officials who asserted
states' rights were temporarily. popular in their own districts but
were:so~n overwhelmed by.thesocial forces sweeping the country.
Ame,rica i~ the end honc:>red ~ejtidg~)vho epforced desegregation
, .. decrees a~ strong ancl wise. ~cl visionary. These assertive judges
and the civil rights lawyers who appealed to them were the heroes of
.the day.
Yet federal courts did more than stop constitutional violations
in· the desegregation cases. Ongoing resistance to compliance With
the lawforced federal judges to undertake the policy-making work
·~/·;·

of school boards and, later, prison wardens. Understandably, the
judges wanted the institutions under them to become not only leg·
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but better. From the death of Jim Crow, there was thus born a
revolutionary idea: that courts could and should reform state and
local governments.

Congress Cashes In
The image of state and local officials as villains in need of judicial
correction began with the South but spread to officials across the
country during the era of antiwar demonstrations and urban riots.
In the resulting culture, mayors and governors came to be considered part of the problem rather than the solution. Local politics that
set priorities through democratic tugging and hauling reflected,
many young lawyers thought, the basest instincts of society. They
Wanted to use the courts to improve society just as the he~oes of
Brown had done before them. Marcia Lowry, who filed the Wilder
case, was one of them. We were, too.

In the late 1960s, with southern segregation on the run, the
moral spotlight turned to poverty and the environment. Books such

t'5 ~ichael Harrington's

The Other America (1962) and Rachel Car~on's Silent,Spring (1962) made the public aware that poverty and
pollution, like. racial segregation, were the unfinished business of
. !}ie·American dream. As with racial segregation, national leaders
blam~d these failures on state and local officials.
. ... ·~gr~~ responded. to· these new challenges by creating statut<)ry rights enforceable in federal court against state and local gov·.· ~mments. Before Brown, -Congress had . created few such rights.
''ngress,,to;be.sure,. h0d vastly .increased national•~e~~tfoh of
, !.Pi$(!neral,a,nd business in pa,rticular,. but it had largely.cex-'

a ~~~i ~e!•<>et.goye~.~~~~·· ~rg~~e·~!!1eil1j~~l>0[~t~ti~.c>re
.eatme11t.:T~e .•f~e[way·in)V~!c~.·.C911gr(!SS'inflpe11s.C!ci,state
. cal g()\fernmentS,was by,giyipg'ih~ill\InODey \vitlj';§fl"fugs at;; ,, ere j!l the·;m~i~··~iffi(!d·at get~g sl,ate:,a.id
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local governments to spend the federal money for its intended usehighway money for highways, housing money for housing-and
were not aimed at using the federal purse for regulating state and
local governments. State and local officials sometimes complained
that spending conditions were too complex or constricting, but enforcement was generally by the federal agency, which might negotiate a plan to achieve eventual compliance but almost never would
turn off the money tap.
In addressing the civil rights challenge, Congress adopted a different strategy. Faced with defiance from elected state and local officials, Congress opted to act primarily.through federal agents, especially U.S. marshals, federal voting inspectors, Department of Justice
attorneys, and federal judges. Congress followed a similar pattern in
President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 War on Poverty, in which federal
officials worked directly with local poverty organizations rather than
through existing state and municipal channels. This was the concept
of maximum feasible participation, which.proved disastrous, as so
brilliantly narrated in Daniel Patrick Moynihan's Maximum Feasible
Misunderstanding. 4
As the Voting Rights Act started to make states in the South more
responsiv,~to African Americans, Congress reverted to its more traditional means of getting its way: it tied federal money to federal
standards. This well-worn strategy had the great advantage of interposing states and cities as buffers between the federal government
and the beneficiaries of the social programs and also allowed Congress to observe the niceties of federalism.
Congress increasingly used spending conditions to regulate how
states and cities ran programs that they had long funded and operated on their own. Governors and mayors had little choice but to
comply, as leaving federal .funds on the table would be political
suicide. This fiscal federalism . or regulatory federalism, as it came
to be called, was the tool by which the federal government im-
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posed national standards on traditional state programs such as
education, welfare, medical assistance, water quality, and highway
construction. 5
Although our topic is court management of state and local governments, not fiscal federalism, fiscal federalism is an ~ssential ingredient in how courts came to govern. Fiscal federalism called for a
new governmental lineup. The federal government assumed the senior role of setting standards on how and when states and localities
would deliver services. To get the federal money, governors and
mayors had to promise to dance to the federal tune.
But who would make sure that the governors and mayors delivered on the promises they gave to secure the federal money? Answer:
the courts. They stood at the ready. Judge Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressed in 1971 the spiri! of the
times: "Our.duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected
in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy'"
Members of Congress, quick to perceive changes that work to
their. advantage, latched on to the courts' willingness to supervise
state and local governments as a way to crown themselves with the
heroic mantel of rights-bestower, The prospect oflegislating popular
generalities arid leaving them to be fleshed out by the courts was
~pecially enticing. After all, what makes the work of elected politi~iaris.hard-,--and makes reelection even harder-is the dash of inter~~·2.F9r:.one example, those who want factories to reduce pollution
clash with rnanagement;: shareholders, customers, and employees,
all <if whom have an, interest in avoiding the expense of pollution
~8.~tt"OLPoliticians ·\.Vhodare enact rules resolving such dashes often
u~~~~\.Vay f~eling that they mad.~more enemies than friends .. Jfthe
~8~ff-~akin?.b~r~e~ were shiit~d to.~e.courts,.nation~J~islators
f~¥1~·.hav~4:t~eir. ¢alee• and.eat it> to9.).They could .•. take.credit for
··bestowing' rightsfwhile lawyers and judges forced state and .local
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the blame for the costs. The state and local

officials would have to impose the higher taxes, tougher

regula-

tions, or service cuts needed to comply with the federal mandates.
This ploy came to be .known among political types as the unfunded

mandate.
Starting with the 1970 Clean Air Act, Congress gave everyone a
right to healthy air. Who had the corresponding duty to cleanit was
not specified.7 The federal lawmakers passed that buck to the elected
branches of state and local government by setting up an elaborate
process in which state and local officials would have to decide who
had to reduce their emissions and how much. To deflect the charge
that.this new right to dean air was not just hot air, the act authorized
citizens to sue in court. The courts, not-Congress, became the place
where .dean air policy would be made. 8
The state and local officials were not to blame for the dirty air, or
no more to blame than Congress, but that was beside the point.
Congress acted as if state and local officials were to . blame, even
though state and.local officials had already done far more to reduce
pollution from factories than the.federal government had done or
would do in the next.decade," On the the?ry imported from the civil
rights desegregation model that states and cities failed the . people,
Congress, in the words of the Supreme.Court, took."a stick to the
Stat~",in the 1970 Clean Air Act.J0
. The. opportunity for . political profit-was irresistible. Legislators
began to make names for themselves .by searching out appealing
causes and then turning them. irito statutory rights enforceable in
federal court against state and focal government. As former New
York City Mayor EdwardL.Koch explained why he, as a.member of
Congress, had voted to create-a.right .to.public.transportation for
people with disabilities: "I voted for that. You'd be crazy to be against
that. When you are a member of Congress ahd you are voting a
mandate and not providing the funds for it, the sky's the limit,"!'
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Thus, from the mid-iseos to the end of the 1970s, Congress went
from regulating state and local governments hardly at all to regulating them in detail. The list of exactions imposed since the 1970s
is staggering, as Figure 1.1 indicates. In statutes enacted between
1970 and 1991, Congress preempted more states' laws than it had
from 1789 to 1969.12 A federal commission concluded in 1996 that
more than 200 separate federal mandates involving 170 federal laws
reached "into every nook and cranny of state and local activities,"!"
A study of reported federal court decisions for the year 1994 found
that more than 3,500 judicial opinions arose under more than 100
separate federal laws involving state and local governments.14 Another study found steady growth of special education litigation follo'!ing passage of the federal statute in 1975.15 Public policy issues
that had once been decided in the political branches, mostly.at the
state and local levels, were now affected, if not controlled directly, by
federal rights enforceable in federal courts.
This mass production of rights became possible because of a
$e~ies of basic structural changes in American politics. For one, the
i.x-~.:;.~en~te no longer protected the states .. Before adoption of the
I§(!yenteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, U.S.
.~~at~isw~re ~iec1:ed by state legislatures, not the voters directly. The
;o~~ systemJo_r,el,ecting senators, whatever its defnerits, tended to
~~~t.~~t s~t~<l.!}d local governments from the predations qf officials

,, ~~h~gt()!}·

'

.vf.l~~'~.2~~~~~cl~ disappeared .'Vith the New De~\.The S~greme
.. ·~Prt.ha~·'f5~f.l~ly stopped Congress fromexteriding i~ reac~
b~y()nd po~ers 'enumerated in the Constitution such as providmg ·
~~~~.~~;~.ff0nse,regitlating .interstate c°,mmerc0is?•~ ~~~?re~
tituti~pal rights~ f~ustt;ategJ>y narrow int~rv~e!'lti()ps -of

Nine Statutes

Two Statutes

Davis-Bacon Act ( 1931)
Hatch Act (I 'MO)

Through the 1940s

No Statutes
1950s

Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Tide VI)
Water Quality Act
Highway Beautification Act
of 1965
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
Wholesome MeatAct
(1967)
Architectural Barriers Act
of 1968
Civil Rights Act of 1968
(Tide VIII)
Wholesome Poultry
Products Act ( 1968)
National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969

1960s

Figure 1.1. Major federal statutes regulating state and local governments.
(See the appendix for descriptions of the statutes and methodology.)

·Twenty-five Stawtes
Occupational Safety and
Health Act ( 1970)
Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970
Uniform Relocation Act of
1970
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19n
Edueation Amendments of
197_2 (Title IX)
federal Watl!r Pollution
Control Act Amendments Of 19n
federal. Insecticide, fungicide, and Rodenticide
,Act(l9n)
N.ational Health Planning
and Resources De.el. opmentAct Of 1974
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Endangered Species Act of
.,i973·
Adocl Disasrer Pn>tection
• ""ctpf 1~73/ i
Emergency HighW.ly
~rgy Conservation
Act (1974f" ••.
f':8e,J?iscriinination ...in
'iJniploymentAct (1974)'
~k .~
Standards Act
'"Amendments of 1974 ·
~!ly Education Rights . .
·crlm<i!'rMc:YActof 191.J
~.
... · ···Dn··.•.n·
··ki· ·.·..··ng·... Wa···
..· · ·..·ter A:..ct
?·1915•·1,,···\"'i/''
' .·. . of•· . ...
~ Discrimination Act of
t;\1.975 i!J.•!'•~i'.:71'''"iii•·..
Ed1.1cation for All Handi·Chi1dn.n Act t
(1975) .. ( ''...
·''
Coast31 Zone l".13iiagement

Sfappe.i

·'· Actof,19n

~eSourte; Conservation· .
Reicovery Act of
7<-'<

Twenty-one Statutes

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982
Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982
Social Security Amendment$ of 1983
Highway Safety Amendments of 1984
Voting Accessibility for the
8derly and Handicapped
Act (1984)
Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984 . ..
Hazardous and SolidWaste
Amendments of 1984
Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985
Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986
Safe Drinking Wati!r Act
· Arriendmems· of 1986
Education of the Handic:ipped Act Amendments
of 1986
Emergency Planning and
Community Right-toKriO..V Act of 1986
Asbestos Hazard EmergeiiCy .Response Act of
1986
cOmmerc..l MotorVehide
Safety Act of 1986
Age DisO:irnination i!l
EmploymentActAwend;; ments ofJ 986,/'c f •
Water Qua&ty Act of 1987
Gvil Right$- Rest0rat:i!)n
Actofl987
v.. Drug-Free Workplace Act
of 1988"' . . ":
•
Fair l;:lousing.ActAmend- ·

&'. rileiiisor 1988 . . . v,/ •

Lead Coiltam.!nation".,,;.
c:1:ontrC>J.ACi'(,f 1988·.··
Ocean DUmpiiig Ban ActfF

Jtn198S>li110z;g&1:.::c'·

Twenty-one Statutes
Americans with Disabilities
Act (1990)
Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990
Oean Air Act Amendments
of 1990
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments
of 1990
Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990
Social Security: Fiscal 1991
Budget Reconciliation
Act
.
''
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amend. ments of 1991
lntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991
Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention
Amendments of 1992
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992
Family and Medical leave
Act of 1993
National Voter Registration
Act of 1993
Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993
Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993
Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994
Safe Dr;inking Water Act·
Amendments of 1996
Personal J\esponsibility ·
andWork Oppor;tunity
., Reco!lciliati9!l t.ci'of' ·
1996 . .
. .
•
Adoption and Safe. FaJJ!il~
Act,1997
lmtivlduals.•Wit!:i . .Oisabilities
Ediicai:ionActAmend- ··

Fo=~.:~~~~~.;Act of .;I 999;:riiJii•••f•" ,,·

TiCke(royyart(andvvork
.,-Jnce~lm~ntJ

sA.a·o. 1 m·:'12W<'i''"''" :
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Congress, however, did not mass-produce mandates against state x
and local governments until the 1970s because the argument that··~
Washington should stick to truly national issues continued to have (
political force. That argument fell into disfavor after southern segre- ·~
gationists invoked states' rights for an ugly purpose.
..
NationaI political parties had also protected state and local gov- •.
ernments by knitting federal legislators, governors, and mayors ':
from the same political party into close coalitions. After Watergate
and the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974, political ..
parties lost much of their power. Just as presidential politics have '1:

changed, S() too have congressional .politics. Working one's way up J'.
the party hierarchy is no longer the only path to status in Congress. 'J
Many legislators make 'names for themselves by searching out ap- .
pealing causes and turning them into statutory rights enforceable ·
against state and local officiais in federal court.
State and local governments were slow to oppose federal man- '
dates, and when they did they often failed. Paul L. Posner, in his :
study ()(unfunded mandates, . explained why.16 National interest 1
groups often have more influence and relevance to the ambitions of'i
membersof Congress than do officials from their own state. When ·
issues erupt, enthtisiasm for action sweeps ovt;r Congress, exciting i
poli!~<;al entrepreneurs to make the iss11e their. own. Advocates for: ..

the, llew initiative emphasize !?.enefits and hide costs. State and local ··•
officials cannot easily oppose ~~w federal programs aimed at helping

~~~~~~.~~=opt;~

constit\le~ts,~~d may
into supporti11ga mandate
·,in order toget a larger share of federal funds. Even when some
opposemandates.fhey have little success because the price of mandatesis paid by everyone and therefore is the particular concern
no. op~: The national media a.}s() wor!cagainst state and local opposition to mandates. Television especially hasthe capacity to universalize current ideas and to make famous Those political leaders seeking
to creat~1~ational standards. In addition, until recently, most mem-
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hers of the media grew up during the civil rights era and came to
believe that the assumptions of that period were universally applicable to all policy issues. They are swept along with everyone else.

The Rise of Public Interest Law
Every spring in the half century since Brown v. Board of Education,
many of the thousands of new law school graduates begin their legal
careers dreaming of becoming heroes asserting rights in court or
creating them in Congress. We ourselves felt these aspirations. One
of us (Schoenbrod) began his legal career as a law clerk for one of the
heroes who argued Brown in the Supreme Court, Judge Spottswood
W. Robinson III. Both of us worked in the 1970s as public interest
attorneys in one of the premier advocacy organizations, the Natural
Resources Defense Council.
Publicinterest attorneys were near cousins of civil rights attorneys such as Thurgood Marshall. We sought changes that went beyond constitutional rights such as freedom of speech. Our work
extended to all social concerns, from poverty and the environment to .: prisons, consumerism, women's -rights, education, and
health benefits. We would stand up to landlords, big corporations,
and municipal ~fficials. Public interest attorneys sought to provide
legai,representation to interests that historically had been underJe~f.~ented.17
p;•;,~~ecialty law centers sprouted up. When Brown v. Board ofEdu. (;Qtion was decided, the only cause-oriented lawyer groups were
. ,the~erican Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP Legal.Defense
F~n~PBtiilding on.these models; the Ford Foundation fundedthe
~- ~~~~[J~t3SI1izabl•e .•. public: in!~restla\\fcfirm, a community 3ffice in
~~~J~av~n~~nn~cticut, in 196J.-'fhat~ame:yeara similat" organi~~~nn¥~~~tionfornYou:!11,···setup.·•·s~op .on: New0York\City's
•. Lower East S~de. Favorable ~ublicity
these two new groups-and
1

for
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support from the organized bar-led to the creation of the federal
legal services program as part of President Johnson's W~r on Poverty. By 1967, the Office of Economic Opportunity had funded three
hundred local legal services organizations and a dozen national law
'~

j

reform centers to focus on test cases and legislative change in particular areas such as education, health, consumer law, housing, welfare, and economic development.18 Private, nongovernmental public interest law firms also appeared, among them the Environmental
Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center
for Law and Social Policy, the Children's Defense Fund, Public Advocates, and the New York City Legal Aid Society's Prisoners' Rights
Project. Critical to the growth of these centers was the fact that the
Internal.Revenue Service decided in 1971 that public interest litigation was a charitable activity.deserving tax-exempt status. This
brought money and legitimacy.19 Although public interest law continued to cause controversy, it had become part of the legal terrain.
The new federal standards for states and localities empowered us
and our public interest colleagues. Federal statutes and federal regulations allowed recentJawschool graduates to steamroll statehouses
and municipal councils throughout the land.
Our power dependedon our ability to enforce the standards in
federal.courtzIf enforcement.were.solely by federal agencies and not
also by federal COUrts,Ltl,:ie agencies could bend 'the Standards in
response to political pre,ssure,brought by mayors and governors. We
insisted instead on rights enforceable in court by us.;D<:segregation
. was always the analogy. With public interest attorneys on the case
and thedoo~s to the federal courthouse open, what ought to be done
would be done, or so wexargued.'Politically, this translated to a
demand that the public interest bar be accepted as «private attorneys
general" to enforce federal laws whenever the federal government
failed to do the job. We in .the public interest bar amended the
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pyramidal relationships first envisioned by Congress. Under our
amendment, the federal government remained as regulator on the
top setting the standards, with states and localities at the bottom
mandated to comply with the federal standards. In the middle, however, as the chief enforcers of the standards, would be the private
"public interest" attorney.
The demand that private attorneys be given public power was
most famously answered in the citizen suit provision first incorporated ~the Clean Air Act of 1970. As proposed, the act would have
made federal officials solely responsible for assuring that the states
complied with federal standards. This did not sit well with environmentalists and led to discussions between David Sive, a founder of
the environmental public interest bar, and Tim Atkinson, general
counsel to President Nixon's Council on Environmental Quality,
The'environmentalists of the era analogized environmental rights to
constitutional rights. They drafted a proposed amendment to the
Glean Air Act that allowed private citizens to enforce federal stanr~af(.ls~nd,ifsuccessful, to win court-awarded attorneys' fees paid by
~eJoser.·~is citizen suit provision was inserted into the pending
~illand passed Congress without attracting much attention. Similar
Citizen suit provisions were later inserted in succeeding environ•. m~ntal'statutes as well as many nonenvironmental statutes, such as
th~"At,nencans with Disabilifies'Act,
''J'li~·'citizensuitprovi:;ion in its many forms created a powerful
·:;!?.?hthat li~~d uvo of the most P?!ent ideals inrthe :American
• canon: (1) the right of the individual fo lawful treatment by govern•. :ll1~nt·and (2) -the .moral authority of courts to condemn illegality.
· · ~~~sF'n()~le:~~ea!f g()t~~!L~e~igr,e.~ in ~e'~~f~~c~~.~~t of
tltutional rights~·th~l~slators!n••Congress nowhad lJ.Wayto
ainst states~ahd·localitie5: In this
duce statutory riSh
heroes; so did federal judges arid
icmall~gislatorsb
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public interest attorneys. Heroes in Congress proclaimed new rights,
hero-judges enforced the new rights against the law-breaking state
and local officials, and hero-attorneys guarded the new rights.

The Courts Go with the Flow
:',,.;,

There was a time as late as the mid 1970s when it was still doubtful
whether judges would assume managerial control of government
programs except when necessary to remedy egregious violations of
civil rights. In our careers at the Natural Resources Defense Council,
we saw the courts move from reluctance to enthusiastic embrace of
their new role. In the early 1970s, we sometimes lost cases because
judges felt that it was inappropriate for private plaintiffs to micromanage state and local governments. By the end of the 1970s, we
were winning these cases and negotiating lengthy consent decrees
that bind such governments to this day.
Take, for example, our own efforts to improve the mass transit
system In.New YorkCity. Our first efforts began with a 1973 noise
pollution lawsuit brought in the name of children trying to learn in
an elementary school adjacent to an elevated subway track. We asked
the rrransit Authority to reduce subway noise so that children.could
learn and employees and riders would not suffer hearing loss. The
state high court·. dismissed our suit;~0 That .noise ·standards were
yiolated was besidecthe point; the judges ruled, because courts
could not .. correct: the<yiolatipns without enmeshing themselves
in publictadministration, The decision-which, at the time, we
thought wrong=was one of the last times that New York State courts
stuck to the traditional concept that they should not control policy.
But subway: noisei·WaS onlyjone symptom of a deeper crisis.
Public transit . was. fighting a losing ·battle against the private car.
Cities had failed to maintain their transit systems, and the systems
were falling apart. Unwilling to raise fares, to postpone union wage
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increases, or to raise taxes, politicians held down costs by "deferring"
maintenance. Although cities sought help from Washington, Congress never delivered much for public transportation.
Congress, however, had promised dean air-and auto congestion produced pollution. Here was a legal hook, which proponents of public transit could'use to regain the initiative. If subways
ran better, fewer people would drive cars; less traffic would mean
cleaner air.
New York took the right to dean air seriously. Governor Nelson
A. Rockefeller and Mayor John V. Lindsay agreed on a dean air plan
that included. bridge tolls to fund transit improvements, But the
officials who succeeded Rockefeller and Lindsay hesitated to impose
tolls because tolls would be unpopular with motorists.
Relying on Congress's declaration that citizens· had a right to
clean air, we decided that we would be the ones who would enforce
that right in the New York courts. In 1975 we went to federal court in
1v.{anhattan to force the state and city to implement the dean air
plan, ,including tolls. U.S. District Court Judge Kevin T. Duffy refused to enter an injunction on the grounds that it would enmesh
him in public policy decisions thatshould be left to elected officials.
We appealed to the court of appeals to discipline Judge Duffy by
·ordering him to enforcei,!}le law. The appeals court ordered him to
do so>" pointing out that Congrt1s had expressly given citizens a right
~(j ~citthy air and had specifically alithorized citizens to vindicate
~()lations 'of that, right in federal court. Judge . Walter·· Mansfield
~ote ~at "Congress made dear that citizen groups are not to be
treated as nuisances -or troublemakers but rather as welcomed part~cipants in the vindication of environme11tal interest5:'21
·t,;~,Si}Vhathapp~J1.ed nm was an exerd~ej? P~fepolitks: Legislators,
~h() had b~~n ~.~ytoo happy.to anno~ce a general right.to dean
~fr;.
backed 'offwhen they heard complaints from constituents/judge~..
' ....
',

'

·P11ffy'sdecision J:ia<l: shown that Congress was, the ultimate source <lf
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the bridge-toll requirement. Once that became clear, the city's representatives in Washington wrote tolls out of the Clean Air Act. Led
by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Senate and Elizabeth Holtzman
in the House, Congress outlawed both our lawsuit and Governor
Rockefeller's decision favoring tolls. When we asked the congressional leaders how the state should meet Congress's clean air standards
without bridge tolls, they would not say,
The legislators in Washington usually escape personal blame for
the consequences of the rights they impose because the costs o
honoring rights typically fall on the public generally and not some
discrete group such as those who commute into Manhattan by car.
Consequently, legislators rarely reconsider the rights they bestow.
That leaves the courts free to enforce the rights as originally enacted.
With the supreme legislature in the land positively commanding the
courts to lead the way, many judges marched forward into policy
making, and did so openly, even self-righteously, The assumption,
borrowed from the days of massive resistance to school desegregation, was that if state or local government failed to honor the new
rights, the reason had to be official resistance.> But official resistance seldom is the cause. Unlike the officials in the old South who
resisted the goal of desegregation because their white constituent
opposed it, state and local officials toda~;favor the goals of the ne
rights because their constituents support them. The problem for th
officialsand for the courts is'lliat the same constituents often oppose
the measures needed to translate the goals into reality.

Seeds of Doubt .
Lawyers'today have grown up in a culture believing that many of the
improvements that people want come only through judicially enforceable rights. But long before democracy by decree, citizen advocates' and public officials worked for reform in other ways. They
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organized, petitioned, voted, testified, and appealed to public opinion and state and local legislatures.
Believers in democracy by decree argue that political progress is
not fast enough or cannot be trusted. We thought the same when we
· were public interest lawyers, but we were wrong. Looking back, we
see that our own accomplishments came chiefly from politics as
usual, not democracy by decree.
Our court victories did little to clean the air, and our successes
were mostly at the sufferance of society. Although we lost the subway
noise lawsuit in the courts. of law, we ultimately won_through politics. The worst of the noise came from flat spots on subway car
wheels. Once a steel wheel gets even a little out of round, the wheel
skids on the flat spot whenever the brakes are applied, making the
flat spot larger .. Without proper maintenance, the enlarged flat spots
hang like hammers when the train runs at normal speed. Our lawsuit was rejected, but the political pressures we set in motion forced
politiCians to find ways to bring the wheels back into round.
Congress got. rid of the bridge tolls, hut, working with Mayor
Koch, the City Planning Department, and the Transit Authojity, we
Pllhlished a.bOok in 1978, A New Direction in Transit, that showed
h~w to make the transit system reliable.23 All New York newspapers
endorsed our plan; which laid the groundwork for the state to de_velop a series of capital programs that over time largely transformed
}lil~~;'Y~~kCity'spublic transportation system ata cost so far of more
thaJ1$20 billion.
Our. Clean Air Act victories in the courtroom produced very
little improvement in air quality, The lengthy court ~rders tilti~ately
~fl1posed on.NewYork City regulated how it assigned police, cont~~~~d·~~affic; and permitted the operation of parkinglotsrhut in
marginally affected air quality.

< ~~neral only

We had aspired -to be. like· Thurgood Marshall. -Instead •.of the
'constjtutional right of.equality that Marshall fought.for, werelied on
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the congressionally declared right _to clean air. The federal courts
backed us with orders and favorable decisions, including one from
Marshall himself sitting as the circuit justice. After a memorable
argument in his chambers in the Supreme Court building in Washington, Justice Marshall· wrote a decision denying Mayor Abraham D. Beame's request to stay Judge Duffy's toll order pending an
opportunity for the mayor to present the city's case to the full Supreme Court. The city never needed that hearing, however, because
Congress eliminated the city's. bridge-toll requirement that same
summer.
The public interest bar oversells the ability of courts to reform
society. People are prone to mistake the doings of heroes, including
the heroes of Brown v. Board of Education, for the whole of history.
As Leo Tolstoy wrote in. War and Peace, "in historic events, the socalled great men are labels giving names to events and like labels they
have but the smallest connexion with the event itself:'24 Tolstoy
was arguing that the French invasion of Russia in 1812 was not
caused by the great men on the scene-Emperor Napoleon and Czar
Alexander--but rather had "myriads of causes": "The deeper we
delve in search of these causes the more of them we find; and each
separate cause or whole series of causes appears to us equally valid in
itself and equally false by its insignificance compared to the magnitude . of the-events. ;• .•. The .actions.of Napoleon and Alexander, on
whose words the ev~nt seeme:~to hang, were as little voluntary as the
actions of any soldier.who was drawn into the campaign by lot or by
conscription ... ; The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the
more people he is connected with and the more power he has over
others, ihe more evident is the predestination and inevitability of his
every acticm??25
Similarly, the prime causes of the death of Jim Crow were not the
heroesras heroic as they were; but the forces that led .society to want
. to extirpate that disease from . the body politic. The courts played
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a vital role. Brown v. Board of Education forced society to decide
whether it wanted to honor its higher principles. When society answered "yes;' courts were needed to impose remedies on recalcitrant
. officials, such as the governors who blocked the schoolhouse door.
Yet, on balance, the courts rode the wave of history rather than
set it in motion. Seen from this broader perspective, the heroism in
the courthouse is no less heroic, but of a different nature. Thurgood
·Marshall, Earl Warren, and their colleagues did not command their
country to stop segregation, but they did diagnose the. disease and
recommend a cure. In the end, the cure came from society, not from
the courts. Judge Spottswood Robinson told one of us not long
before he died: "We weren't the heroes. The heroes were our clients.
We came and went, but they had to stay and face the intolerance
everyday:'
The basic premise of democracy by decree is that government
can be made more compassionate only if judges impose their will
on elected officials. Although dubious on many scores, that assertion has popular appeal precisely because most people want a comP<t.SSionate government. The same voters elect both the rrrembers ·

(}f Congres5 and state and local governmental officials. Why then
~~ould the federal officials be the more compassionates.
. The battle to overthrow segregation is.not the right model for all
T.~~~rrelati()11shipsbetween federal and state and local officials. By
~~~P.f>!~tin& ~~t battle to a whole host of newly minted rights, we

~~~~-f~~~l,-~~a,pew g()verqmental lineup in which one set of officials
.. .

e f;deralJev~l largely escapes accountability for the costs of the

. . . ••'••' $fi,ey p~~ and a9other setof officials at the state and local levels
.!a~).<S\'!;be_po}!er .!() balance the costs of implementing the federal
~irx.ngli!s ~gai11~t other..coJI1peting priorities .. Perhaps federal
;·sllouldjmposemandates
on state andlocal governments.26
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ll()!,.~.qu~~tion we address. Our.focus is on what happens in
'Sb~.;,furenty~firstcentury after Congress has spoken and judges are
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asked to empower a controlling group to manage and supervise
institutions of state or local government.
Congress, whatever the limits ultimately imposed under the federal Constitution, should be sensitive to the consequences of the
mandates it proposes. It does not have to be, however, because of
democracy by decree. Through democracy by decree, the courts
exonerate the politicians in Washington from blame for the messes
they create by commandeering state and local governments and
thereby assuming the power to make policy.

